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JLhe commercial banking industry as a
whole fared well in 1992, with many in-
stitutions citing improvements in profit-
ability. Despite this overall good news,
however, analysts continue to question
the health of some sectors of the in-
dustry. Such doubts ring familiar to
those who recall banks' difficulties in the
1980s as a result of overinvestment in
loans to agricultural and energy inter-
ests, to less-developed countries, and to
commercial real-estate ventures in the
Northeast and Southwest.
The underlying concern seems to be that
banks are "too risky," referring either to
the volatility of bank assets or to threats
to the overall economy, depositors, the
deposit insurance fund, or taxpayers. Per-
haps banks made a series of investments
that, while seemingly reasonable at the
time, have since turned out to be bad bets.
On the other hand, some economists
would argue that a combination of regula-
tions, including government guarantees,
has induced banks to assume greater risk,
and at lower borrowing rates, than they
otherwise would have.
Measuring the riskiness of bank liabilities
in absolute terms is difficult. In theory,
potential lenders to a bank (such as pur-
chasers of equity or debt instruments or
certificates of deposit) incorporate their
assessment of the soundness of the
bank's assets into the rate of return they
require on their investment. If this in fact
occurs, and banks must pay for their risk,
one could measure risk simply by look-
ing at market-determined interest rates.
There may be reasons, however, why
bank funding costs do not fully reflect
risk or why regulators would not want
to rely on market discipline. The
presence of a system of deposit in-
surance in which premiums incorrectly
gauge risk may induce bank manage-
ment to assume greater levels of risk,
and has been cited as a justification for
capital regulation and for detailed ex-
aminations of bank balance sheets.
Some argue that the deposit insurance
subsidy to risk increases with greater
leverage (lower capital-to-asset ratios),
necessitating more regulatory control.
All of these perspectives are useful to
consider in evaluating banks' exposure to
highly leveraged transactions (HLTs).
The aftermath of the wave of leveraged
buyouts in the 1980s brought a realization
that banks had played a key role in fi-
nancing such transactions. In response,
regulators required financial institutions
to report information on their involve-
ment in HLTs, beginning in the first quar-
ter of 1991. Since this practice began,
there has been a general perception that
banks have abandoned the HLT market.
Nonetheless, many market observers
were surprised when regulators an-
nounced that banks would no longer be
required to report HLT involvement
separately. Effective the third quarter of
1992, bank HLT activity is simply com-
bined with other loans, and most of these
loans will now fall into the commercial
and industrial (C&I) category.
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In response to increased bank involve-
ment in highly leveraged transactions
(HLTs) in the 1980s, regulators col-
lected confidential data in 1991 and
1992. In examining these data, this
study finds that while some banks re-
main heavily involved in HLTs, overall
bank exposure to these activities poses
little threat to bank capital or to the
bank insurance fund.
This Economic Commentary character-
izes changing bank involvement in HLTs.
Using confidential information supplied
by banks from the first quarter of 1991 to
the first quarter of 1992,1 assess the data
in terms of the various risks posed by
highly leveraged activity. These data
show a steadily declining scope of bank
involvement. However, the institutions
that dealt most in HLTs at the onset of the
report period generally continued to be
the most strongly involved at the end.
• Regulatory Response to Bank
Involvement with HLTs
With mounting evidence of the poten-
tial aggregate impact of HLTs in the
1980s also came an awareness of the
rough magnitude of banks' involve-
ment. One expert, C.E.V. Borio, states
that banks provided more than 50 per-
cent of total financing for leveraged
buyouts (LBOs)—the most visible
form of HLTs—in the United States
from late 1987 to mid-1989.
4 A wide
ISSN0428-1276range of academic studies contends that
LBOs and other merger-related transac-
tions were consistent with improve-
ments in economic performance. If so,
then banks' willingness to provide
funding for such transactions would
have resulted in balance-sheet entries
whose values accurately reflected the
risk involved in firm restructuring.
However, speculation was growing that
HLTs in the latter stages of the LBO
boom were not necessarily justified by
potential economic gains. Finally,
concerns arose that some of the factors
responsible for the savings and loan
debacle might also be present in the
commercial banking industry.
In response to these worries, the three
U.S. bank regulatory agencies sought
to coordinate efforts to monitor bank in-
volvement in HLTs. The major hurdle
was agreeing upon a definition of
"highly leveraged."
6 In April 1989, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) conducted a study of large-bank
involvement in HLTs, followed in Octo-
ber with a joint declaration of regulations
by the OCC, the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve
System. These were supplemented in Feb-
ruary 1990 by the announcement of a defi-
nition of HLTs for which banks would be
required to report data beginning in 1991.
Accordingly, two conditions would have
to be met for a transaction to be classified
as highly leveraged: It must 1) involve a
"buyout, acquisition, or recapitalization of
an existing business," or 2) at least double
the liabilities of the borrower and yield
leverage ratios greater than 0.50, or result
in a leverage ratio of at least 0.75 with no
less than 25 percent of total liabilities con-
sisting of debt related to buyouts, acquisi-
tions, or recapitalizations. This informa-
tion was to be reported quarterly on the
Federal Financial Institutions Examina-
tion Council's Consolidated Reports on
Condition and Income, or "call reports."
Banks asserted that the definition did
not distinguish between transactions
that were justified or unjustified on the
basis of anticipated cash flow. They
also voiced concerns that the require-
ment to list HLTs on the call reports
would lead to a curtailment of credit just
when its extension seemed crucial to
keep the economy afloat. In particular,
such a regulatory-induced credit
crunch seemed to be affecting the high-
ly leveraged cable television industry.
The leverage threshold also did not ac-
count for differences across industries.
Partly in response to these worries about
the impact on credit availability, the
regulatory agencies announced in early
1992 that the reporting requirements
would cease after the second quarter of
the year. Henceforth, examiners would as-
sess bank involvement in HLTs as they
would for other transactions.
• Evidence from the Call Reports
To study the change in bank involvement
in HLTs, I examined quarterly balance-
sheet information reported to the three
regulatory agencies from the first quarter
of 1991 to the first quarter of 1992.1
focus only on the institutions that sup-
plied applicable data in each quarter. The
number of banks varied from 12,227 in
1991:IQto 11,787 in 1992:IQ.
Unfortunately, the call report data prob-
ably do not cover the period of maximum
HLT involvement by banks. The Senior
Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank
Lending Practices, compiled by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, shows that from December 1989 to
December 1990, LBOs as a share of total
merger-related loans outstanding fell
from 57.7 percent to 43.7 percent. The
declines for large banks (with more than
$10 billion in assets) and small banks
($ 10 billion or less in assets) were from
54.0 percent to 44.9 percent and from
68.2 percent to 37.2 percent, respectively.
Although total merger-related loans as a
percentage of total C&I loans outstand-
ing remained essentially unchanged, the
involvement of smaller banks decreased.
The overall picture, then, is that bank
involvement in HLTs, at least as meas-
ured by LBO participation, had already
declined markedly by the time the HLT
reporting requirements began. This is
not surprising, because there is often a
significant lag between the point when
the market and regulators become
aware of a problem and when some
regulatory action, such as reporting re-
quirements, is implemented.
• Characteristics of Banks
Involved in HLT Activities
Relatively few banks were involved in
highly leveraged activity during the
period studied: Only 385 cited positive
HLT volume on every call report from
the first quarter of 1991 through the
first quarter of 1992. Banks involved
in HLTs tended to be larger, with an
average asset size of $5.19 billion at the
end of 1991:IQ, compared with $112.6
million for the other 11,842 institutions.
The 385 banks on average held HLT
balances of $192 million, amounting to
3.7 percent of their total assets.
These banks also tended to differ from
the majority in terms of capitalization
and portfolios. The average ratio be-
tween qualifying capital and total as-
sets for the 385 banks was 7.8 percent,
compared with 8.1 percent for the en-
tire group represented in the 1991 :IQ
call reports.' Banks involved in HLTs
were less reliant on real-estate lending
(35.3 percent of total loans versus 39.9
percent for all banks), but depended
more on C&I loans (34.7 percent ver-
sus 28.8 percent), which constitute the
vast majority of HLT lending.
From 1991 :IQ through 1992:IQ, banks'
HLT activity declined steadily. For the
11,788 banks that reported on the latter
date, highly leveraged activities fell to
$4.05 million on average, or 1.4 per-
cent of total assets. Focusing on the top
half of the banks that reported any HLT
involvement in 1991 :IQ, I find that by
1992:IQ, their HLT numbers declined
from $377 million (4.4 percent of as-
sets) to $249 million (2.8 percent of as-
sets). Capital adequacy also improved.
The ratio described above reached 8.3
percent for all banks and moved from
7.8 percent to 8.0 percent for the top
half of the 385 banks.
• A Digression
Even if all banks were operating with
sufficient capital (as determined by
guidelines under the Basle accords, ef-
fective at the end of 1992), one could
not safely conclude that regulatorsshould ignore exposure to HLTs. First,
there is no such thing as the "right"
amount of capital; no single ratio com-
pletely captures either the soundness or
riskiness of a financial institution. In
theory, market-determined risk premia,
risk-based deposit insurance premiums,
or risk-based capital measures can
force banks to act as if the market were
pricing risk correctly. Although some
objective standards can be used to as-
sess the riskiness of banks, detailed ex-
aminations of balance sheets are in-
evitably part of the regulatory process.
In practice, a variety of financial ratios
can be examined to supplement the in-
formation summarized in the risk-based
capital ratio. One aspect of potential ex-
posure to HLTs is that banks that are
highly involved with these transactions
may also be relatively highly exposed
to other risky assets. The system of
risk-based capital does not consider
that events capable of causing defaults
on HLT assets may simultaneously cre-
ate problems with other assets.
• Other Risks
Real-estate lending has been a focus of
great concern among observers of the
banking industry. Again comparing the
top half of the banks involved in HLTs
(totaling 192) to the average for all banks
at both the start and end of the sample
period, I find that real-estate loans as a
percentage of total loans for the 192 in-
stitutions rose from 33.6 percent to 34.2
percent. For all banks combined, the
increase was from 39.9 percent to 41.8
percent. Thus, although HLT banks were
less involved with real estate, both cate-
gories of banks became increasingly de-
pendent on these loans. Conversely, C&I
involvement fell for both categories, from
36.7 percent to 35.0 percent for the 192
banks, and from 28.8 percent to 26.9 per-
cent for all banks.
One critical measure of risk is directed
to the bank insurance fund. It arises
when a bank, if closed due to a decline
in asset values relative to liabilities, has
inadequate capital to meet the shortfall
and draws upon the bank insurance
fund to repay general creditors at par.
Evaluating this risk requires an assess-
ment of the adequacy of capital require-
ments and regulatory scrutiny. If, on
the other hand, regulators deem the
bank "too big to fail," yet another risk
ensues (to the deposit insurance fund
and/or taxpayers) as forbearance in the
face of insolvency allows such institu-
tions to continue operations even when
the market would not support their con-
tinued existence. HLT assets, because
they are held mainly by large banks,
which are more likely to be deemed too
big to fail, may be of concern to
regulators as a result of these risks.
How much danger does HLT activity
pose for bank capital? The ratio between
HLT involvement and qualifying capital
gives a worst-case view of how much
qualifying capital would be eaten up if all
HLT assets were declared worthless. For
the top half of highly leveraged banks in
1991:IQ, HLT assets amounted to 56.5
percent of qualifying capital. By the end
of the first quarter of 1992, that percent-
age had fallen to 34.7 percent. A some-
what more revealing number is the ratio
between HLT assets that are past due, or
nonaccruing, and qualifying capital. For
the same 192 banks, this measure fell
from 5.97 percent at the beginning of the
period to 4.18 percent by the end. It is
substantially less than that for real-estate
credits past due or nonaccruing, which
posted shares of 28.9 percent and 25.6
percent of qualifying capital for 1991:IQ
and 1992:IQ, respectively.
Another perspective that bears scrutiny
is bank participation in HLT loans. Par-
ticipation implies that a group of banks
has joined to make a loan that presum-
ably could not be made by any of them
individually. Once again, involvement
through this vehicle has declined, as
the top banks relied less on this form of
HLT credit in 1992:IQ than in 1991:IQ.
As a percentage of total HLT involve-
ment (participation plus direct involve-
ment), participation fell from 18.3 per-
cent to 16.5 percent. Unlike other
ratios measured here, however, this ac-
tivity is lower for the top 192 banks
than for the rest. For all banks com-
bined, participation accounted for 73.4
percent and 69.4 percent of total involve-
ment at the opening and close of the
period, respectively.
• Characteristics and
Trends for the Top 20
Examining just the top 20 banks in
terms of their involvement in HLT lend-
ing reaffirms most of the conclusions
reached above. Based on the percentage
of total gross loans made up of HLTs in
the first quarter of 1991, the following
comparisons between the top 20 banks
and the top half of all HLT banks are
valid: The top 20 are 1) larger (average
assets of $13.1 billion versus $8.6 bil-
lion), 2) better capitalized (qualifying
capital to total assets ratio of 8.0 per-
cent versus 7.8 percent), 3) more in-
volved in C&I lending (54.7 percent of
total loans versus 34.7 percent), 4) less
active in real-estate lending (20.3 per-
cent of total loans versus 38.3 percent),
and 5) suffering relatively more from
nonperforming HLT loans than from
other C&I loans (53.0 percent of total
C&I past due and nonaccruing loans
are made up of HLT loans for the top
20 banks versus 30.9 percent for the
top half).'
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Finally, I assess the changes that occurred
for the banks listed as the top 20 HLT
lenders as of the first quarter of 1991. If
ranked by the proportion of loans that
were highly leveraged, 15 of the 20 were
still in the top group in the first quarter of
1992. These banks were generally better
capitalized, with ratios that improved
from 8.0 percent to 8.3 percent. There
was also a decrease in the proportion be-
tween total HLT loans past due and non-
accruing and qualifying capital, which
fell from 10.6 percent in 1991:IQ to 7.2
percent in 1992:IQ.
• Conclusion
Bank involvement in HLTs has declined
since the first quarter of 1991, when
banks were first required to report these
activities. However, because bank in-
volvement in these transactions had al-
ready begun to taper off by the time
reporting requirements were initiated,
there is no reason to suggest that the
decline was a result of regulatory scru-
tiny.
1
4 HLT activity seems to account
for a small portion of total lending.In terms of problem HLT assets, and
relative to real-estate loans, there is lit-
tle evidence that HLT loans pose a sub-
stantial threat to bank capital or to the
bank insurance fund. Banks involved
in the HLT market tend to be compara-
tively larger (albeit more poorly capital-
ized), more dependent on C&I lending,
and less involved in real-estate lending.
Though HLT activity on banks' balance
sheets has diminished over time, the 20
banks most highly involved in the mar-
ket in the first quarter of 1991 were
still strongly represented by the end of
the first quarter of 1992.
• Footnotes
1. For all insured commercial banks, return
on assets for the first three quarters of 1992
was 0.96 percent, compared with 0.59 per-
cent for the first three quarters of 1991. See
The FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile, Third
Quarter 1992. Washington, D.C.: FDIC.
2. HLT exposure will still be an area of pos-
sible scrutiny during a bank's annual ex-
amination.
3. Second-quarter 1992 data were not avail-
able at the time this paper was written. The
data that banks submit describing HLT ac-
tivity are confidential, although the balance
of the data on banks' quarterly call reports is
public information.
4. See C.E.V. Borio, "Banks' Involvement
in Highly Leveraged Transactions," Bank for
International Settlements, BIS Economic
Papers No. 28, October 1990.
5. See Barrie A. Wigmore, "The Decline in
Credit Quality of New-Issue Junk Bonds,"
Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 46, no. 5
(September/October 1990), pp. 53-62.
6. Banks can become exposed to HLTs in
various ways. I focus on the financing of HLTs
through equity, senior debt, or mezzanine fi-
nance (unsecured loans with maturities of at
least five years that are dependent on cash flow
for prepayment and allow the lender to share in
the future success of the business). However,
banks also provide commitments for financing,
originate or participate in loan syndications,
originate deals, and buy or sell HLT loans. See
Borio, "Banks' Involvement in Highly Lever-
aged Transactions."
7. Other, more technical concerns are dis-
cussed in Creighton R. Meland, Jr., "Highly
Leveraged Transactions: Clarifying the New
Guidelines," Issues in Bank Regulation, vol.
14, no. 3 (Winter 1991), pp. 3-8.
8. See William Goodwin, "Lenders Bom-
bard Bank Regulators with Criticism of HLT
Definition," American Banker, September
30, 1991, and Barbara A. Rehm, "Agencies
Weigh Four Options for Revising HLT Defi-
nition," American Banker, January 9, 1992.
9. Here, HLT loans refer to the entries re-
ported as "senior debt, mezzanine financing,
and equity investments currently outstanding"
on the call reports. Some banks also were re-
quired to report data on commitments and
participations or assignments.
10. Qualifying capital equals the total amount
of capital considered under the Basle accords
on capital standards, which became effective at
the end of 1992. However, this ratio is not ex-
actly comparable to either the leveraging or
capital-asset ratios discussed in the accords.
11. These 192 banks represent the top half
of the HLT banks based on 1991 :IQ rank-
ings. I follow these banks through time in-
stead of comparing different banks.
12. If the banks are ranked by the ratio be-
tween HLT assets and qualifying capital, the
top 20 are less well capitalized than the top
192 (7.1 percent versus 7.8 percent).
13. I investigated the possibility that al-
though the top 20 banks had relatively more
nonperforming HLT loans, they were also
more aggressive in managing that portion of
their portfolio. Using the ratio between HLT
charge-offs and total C&I charge-offs, I found
that the top 20 managed their HLT portfolios
less aggressively in 1991 :IQ.
14. At least direct scrutiny cannot be given
credit. The anticipation of reporting require-
ments may have had an impact. Changes in
bank behavior could also have been a re-
sponse to growing investor concerns about
banks' involvement in HLTs.
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